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Objective: To develop a probabilistic model for discovering and quantifying determinants of outbreak
detection and to use the model to predict detection performance for new outbreaks.
Materials and methods: We used an existing software platform to simulate waterborne disease outbreaks
of varying duration and magnitude. The simulated data were overlaid on real data from visits to emer-
gency department in Montreal for gastroenteritis. We analyzed the combined data using biosurveillance
algorithms, varying their parameters over a wide range. We then applied structure and parameter learn-
ing algorithms to the resulting data set to build a Bayesian network model for predicting detection
performance as a function of outbreak characteristics and surveillance system parameters. We evaluated
the predictions of this model through 5-fold cross-validation.
Results: The model predicted performance metrics of commonly used outbreak detection methods with
an accuracy greater than 0.80. The model also quantiﬁed the inﬂuence of different outbreak characteris-
tics and parameters of biosurveillance algorithms on detection performance in practically relevant
surveillance scenarios. In addition to identifying characteristics expected a priori to have a strong
inﬂuence on detection performance, such as the alerting threshold and the peak size of the outbreak,
the model suggested an important role for other algorithm features, such as adjustment for weekly
patterns.
Conclusion: We developed a model that accurately predicts how characteristics of disease outbreaks and
detection methods will inﬂuence on detection. This model can be used to compare the performance of
detection methods under different surveillance scenarios, to gain insight into which characteristics of
outbreaks and biosurveillance algorithms drive detection performance, and to guide the conﬁguration
of surveillance systems.
 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The past decade has seen the emergence of diseases caused by
previously unrecognized threats and the sudden appearance of
known diseases in new environments. Consequently, infectious
diseases continue to cause high human and ﬁnancial costs. In order
to prevent the spread of infectious diseases, early detection of
disease outbreaks is crucial. One approach to early detection is to
use automated syndromic surveillance systems, which monitor
health-related data from different sources to detect potential
disease outbreaks in a timely fashion.Syndromic surveillance systems continuously apply statistical
algorithms to large volumes of data generated through health-
related behaviors (e.g. counts of emergency department visits) to
detect anomalies and support investigation and control measures.
Many outbreak detection algorithms have been proposed for
use in syndromic surveillance. While it is clear that algorithms
perform differently when they are applied to different data sources
or used in different surveillance situations, there is insufﬁcient
empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of algorithms under
different conditions. Such evidence could guide public health
practitioners in the choice of surveillance systems algorithms and
conﬁgurations. The few existing studies evaluating detection per-
formance are based on data that are not publicly available, making
evaluations difﬁcult to generalize or replicate [1]. Moreover, the
performance of detection algorithms is inﬂuenced by many factors,
including the nature of the disease, characteristics of the outbreak
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weekly mean and standard deviation), and parameters of the
detection method used (such as alerting threshold). Some
researchers [2] argue that the lack of a standardized framework
for the assessment of outbreak detection methods and the diver-
sity of factors that inﬂuence detection performance decreases the
ability to compare detection methods.
The objective of this research is to develop and evaluate a
model for quantitatively characterizing the determinants of out-
break detection performance and predicting the performance of
detection methods. Earlier work [3] showed that it is possible
to predict outbreak detection performance quantitatively with
acceptable accuracy. That research developed a prediction model
based on logistic regression, which assumes a multiplicative
relationship between variables. While this model predicted the
detection performance of the algorithms with reasonable accu-
racy, it could not model complex dependencies between vari-
ables and their relationship with multiple performance metrics.
This limitation was due mainly to the nature of logistic regres-
sion, which implements a ﬂat, linear model. In previous work
[4], we assessed the feasibility of addressing this limitation by
developing a Bayesian network model using data generated thor-
ough simulation. Many different algorithms could be used to
model detection performance, such as support vector machines
(SVM) and random forests. However, we chose to use a graphical
model because it has the advantage of not only providing a pre-
diction of performance, but also providing a representation of
the different probabilistic dependencies between outbreak and
algorithm characteristics, on one hand, and performance, on
the other hand. This information can be useful when trying to
understand which factors inﬂuence the ability of an outbreak
detection algorithm to detect a type of outbreak accurately and
in a timely manner.
This paper signiﬁcantly advances our prior work by combining
outbreak data generated by a realistic simulation model with real
healthcare utilization data and then evaluating the performance
of a wider range of commonly used biosurveillance algorithms.
The resulting dataset is used to build and evaluate a Bayesian net-
work model for predicting detection performance. The developed
Bayesian network can be used for predicting how well different
outbreak detection methods will perform under different circum-
stances. We illustrate a variety of outbreak scenarios and use infer-
ence in the learned Bayesian network to ﬁnd the best settings for
detection methods and predict the detection performance in those
scenarios.
While the Bayesian network is built using simulation data, it
has two major advantages as a predictor over simply querying
the simulation results. On one hand, the Bayesian network is efﬁ-
cient to query when new algorithms or scenarios need to be tested
(as opposed to running an expensive simulation). On the other
hand, the Bayesian network generalizes the information from the
simulation data, allowing queries for outbreak characteristics and
surveillance algorithm traits that have not been simulated. A
secondary effect of the generalization is to smooth out noise and
possible outliers in the simulation data.
The proposed framework for performance evaluation of out-
break detection methods under a wide variety of outbreak circum-
stances is general and can be used in further studies. We note that
while we use the SnAP simulation platform developed at McGill,
the same methodology can be used with other count data, pro-
vided through alternative simulation methods. We anticipate that
the model for predicting detection performance can be used to
develop new biosurveillance methods by identifying ideal algo-
rithms characteristics, which may not exist in any currently avail-
able algorithms. However, building a new detection method is
beyond the scope of this paper.The structure of this paper is as follows: in Section 2, we review
the outbreak detection methods used in our study and describe
common measures of detection performance. In Section 3, we
describe our simulated surveillance data for waterborne disease
outbreaks used in this study and the development and evaluation
of our Bayesian network model. In Section 4, we present the accu-
racy of our model for predicting detection performance and we
illustrate its capability to identify factors that inﬂuence outbreak
detection performance. We also present examples of how the
model can be used in practical scenarios. We close with a discus-
sion of the results, concluding remarks, and directions for future
work.2. Background
In public health practice, many approaches are used analyze
time series of healthcare utilization records with the goal of detect-
ing disease outbreaks. In this paper, we use a popular set of detec-
tion methods based on statistical process control charts, the
C-family of detection algorithms [5] and Adaptive Poisson Regres-
sion. C1, C2, and C3 are adaptive algorithms included in the Early
Aberration Reporting System (EARS) developed by the Centre of
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The C-algorithms assume
that the expected value of the time series for the given time t is
the mean of the values observed in a sliding window. If the differ-
ence between the observed value at a given time t and the mean of
the window divided by the standard deviation of the window is
bigger than a threshold, an unusual event is ﬂagged and the possi-
bility of a disease outbreak is signaled.
The C-algorithms are distinguished by the conﬁguration of two
parameters: the guardband and the memory. Gradually increasing
outbreaks can bias the test statistic upward, so the detection algo-
rithm may fail to ﬂag the outbreak. To avoid this situation, C2 and
C3 use a 2-day gap, called a guardband, between the sliding win-
dow and the test interval. C3 includes 2 recent observations in
the computation of test statistic at time t, which is called memory.
In the EARS system, the size of the window used for the calculation
of the expected value is 7 days; however, this parameter can be
varied. Detection algorithms can be conﬁgured using various alert-
ing thresholds, which result in different sensitivity and false alarm
rates.
Most surveillance tasks based on health care utilization are
affected by weekly patterns. Many health-care facilities have fewer
visits during weekends and there is a sharp increase in the number
of visits on Mondays, which should not be considered an outbreak.
The W2 algorithm is a modiﬁed version of C2 that takes weekly
patterns into account [6], by stratifying the baseline data into
two distinct baselines: one for weekdays, the other for weekends.
The W3 algorithm is the similar counterpart of the C3 algorithm.
Another outbreak detection method, called Adaptive Poisson
Regression, assumes that the distribution of health care utilization
counts in the surveillance time series is Poisson and uses categor-
ical variables to represent trends and patterns. Xing described
Adaptive Poisson Regression, which uses a sliding window of
56 days for estimating the regression coefﬁcients and alerting
threshold [7]. The logarithmic link function estimates the expected
value at time t as:
logðExpectedtÞ ¼ c0 þ ½c1  dowbaselineðtÞ þ ½c2  14daybaselineðtÞ
where c0 is a constant intercept, the term [c1  dowbaseline(t)]cap-
tures the day-of-week effect, and the term [c2  14daybaseline(t)] rep-
resents the current seasonal trends in cycles of 14 days. The Poisson
regression algorithm is adaptive to recent changes in the data and
the algorithm parameters. A 2-day guardband can be used to avoid
the contamination of the sliding window and test interval.
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such as the Shewhart control Chart [8], CUSUM [9], Exponential
Weighted Moving Average algorithms (EWMA) [10], the Shir-
yaew-Roberts method [11], and likelihood ratio-based methods
[12]. More details on these methods can be found in [13,14]. Our
work does not include these algorithms at the moment, because
doing an exhaustive studywould be too time consuming. As a result,
we picked approaches that seem to be used most extensively in
practical surveillance settings. However, it would be conceptually
straightforward to extend our framework to include other biosur-
veillance algorithms and their characteristics.
The performance of outbreak detection algorithms is evaluated
in terms of the speciﬁcity and timeliness of detection. Speciﬁcity is
the probability that no alert will be given when no outbreak has
occurred [15]. It is calculated as:
specificity¼ Pðalarm¼0joutbreak¼0Þ¼nðalarm¼0; outbreak¼0Þ
nðoutbreak¼0Þ
where n(alarm = 0, outbreak = 0) is the number of non-outbreak
days in which the algorithm does not raise an alarm and n(out-
break = 0) is the number of non-outbreak days in an analysis
interval.
Timeliness is the proportion of time saved by detection relative
to the onset of an outbreak (tonset). If an outbreak is detected, time-
liness is deﬁned as:
timeliness ¼ 1 tdetection  tonset
outbreakDuration
where outbreakDuration is the number of days for which outbreak
cases occur. The tdetection is the index of the day within the time ser-
ies when the outbreak is detected and tonset is the index of the day
on which the outbreak starts. The proportion of delay is subtracted
from 1, so higher values denote an earlier detection of the outbreak.
Timeliness is 1 if the outbreak is detected on the ﬁrst day and 0
when the outbreak is not detected at all [15].
In this paper, we measure the detection rate as a performance
metric. Detection is a binary variable which indicates whether each
outbreak is detected or not. It can be deﬁned as sensitivity per out-
break where sensitivity is the probability of raising an alarm given
that an outbreak occurred:
sensitiv ity¼ Pðalarm¼1joutbreak¼1Þ¼nðalarm¼1; outbreak¼1Þ
nðoutbreak¼1Þ
As there is only one outbreak in every time series generated by
the simulator, the detectionwill be 1 if the outbreak is detected and
0 if the algorithm does not trigger any alert. We focus on detection
rate because it measures the overall ability of algorithms to detect
different types of outbreaks. We are interested in predicting how
the detection rate changes in different surveillance settings and
under different algorithm parameter values.
3. Methods
Using administrative data and simulated outbreaks, we created
a data set for performance benchmarking of a number of detection
algorithms and used a Bayesian network to model the performance
of these algorithms.
3.1. Simulated surveillance data
We used a validated model for simulating waterborne out-
breaks of cryptosporidiosis [16], the Simulation Analysis Platform
(SnAP) [17], to generate surveillance data for this study. The simu-
lation model includes components to represent water distribution,
human mobility, exposure to drinking water, infection, diseaseprogression, healthcare utilization, laboratory testing, and report-
ing to public health. We performed many simulations of surveil-
lance data that would result from a waterborne outbreak due to
the failure of a water treatment plant in an urban area. This model
creates a synthetic population from census data, and then uses 30
parameters to deﬁne the progression of individuals through the
model. In the simulation scenarios for generating our data, two
parameters were varied systematically: the duration of water con-
tamination, which was varied over 6 values (72, 120, 168, 240, 360
and 480 h), and the cryptosporidium concentration, which was
varied over 3 levels (106, 105, 104). The possible combinations
of these values deﬁne 18 different scenarios. Each of these 18
scenarios was run 1000 times using Latin Hypercube Sampling to
randomly select values from hyper-distributions for the other
parameters in the model [18]. The simulation parameters and
additional details about the SnAP platform are available from the
authors of the paper upon request.
The outbreak signals were superimposed on baseline data,
which were daily counts of people visiting emergency departments
in Montreal for gastroenteritis, over 6 years. The onset of the out-
break was selected randomly, relative to the baseline. Each simula-
tion contains exactly one outbreak. We did not have ‘‘ground
truth’’ for the real health care utilization data, which means that
real outbreaks could have occurred during this interval. However,
there were no known such outbreaks.
3.2. Algorithm benchmarking data
In this paper, we considered the following set of widely used
detection algorithms: C1, C2, C3, W2, W3 and Adaptive Poisson
Regression with and without guardband. We generated a data set
of detection results by applying these algorithms with different
parameter values to the surveillance data generated according to
the protocol described above. Table 1 presents the features of this
data set grouped according to: the parameters of the detection
algorithm (memory, guardband, weekly pattern, threshold, and
history), the characteristics of the GI baseline data (mean and stan-
dard deviation of the number of emergency department (ED) visits
over the most recent seven days), the characteristics of the out-
breaks added to the baseline data (peak size, time to peak, interval
of outbreak days, contamination level and duration of contamina-
tion), and the metrics used to measure the performance of a detec-
tion algorithm (detection, speciﬁcity, and timeliness). This data set
contained 72,000 instances, consisting of evaluating each algo-
rithm-parameter combination on each of the 18,000 time series.
For each detection algorithm we measured the speciﬁcity and
timeliness of detection on each of the time series. We also mea-
sured detection as a binary variable indicating, for each time series,
whether the outbreak was detected or not.
The binary variable ‘‘weekly pattern’’ was used as a proxy to
indicate whether an algorithm adjusted for day-of-week variations
in counts, with zero indicating C1, C2 and C3, and 1 indicating W2,
W3, and adaptive Poisson. The variable sliding window indicates
the size of the window used to calculate the expected value of
the ED visit count. Its value is 7 days for the C and W algorithms
and 56 days for Adaptive Poisson Regression. The baseline charac-
teristics are statistical characteristics of the ED visit time series
without outbreaks. In the data pre-processing step, continuous
variables (e.g. peak size) were discretized using the k-means func-
tion in Netica software [19] for the ease of use in our Bayesian net-
work model.
3.3. Bayesian network model of algorithm characterization
The extensive simulation and algorithm evaluation that we per-
formed requires resources and expertise not available in many
Table 1
Features of algorithm benchmarking data.
Data feature type Source of data Data feature Description Value
Algorithm parameters Experimentally deﬁned Memory Number of days over which the test statistic is pooled 0, 2
Guardband Gap days between the sliding window and the test day 0, 2
Weekly pattern Whether or not the algorithm adjusts for a weekly pattern 0, 1
Threshold Alerting threshold 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.5,
2, 3, 4, 5
Sliding window
(history)
Size of the window used for the calculation of the expected
value
7, 56
Baseline
characteristics
Healthcare utilization Mean 7 Average data counts in last 7 days [400, 932]
SD7 Standard deviation of 7 recent days [159, 417]
Outbreak
characteristics
Simulation Peak Peak size as the number of additional counts of outbreak
signal above the baseline
[3, 7845]
Time to peak Number of days from the onset of the signal to the peak day [2, 26]
Outbreak interval Length of outbreak signal [4, 52]
Contamination
level
Cryptosporidium concentration in water 106, 105, 104
Contamination
duration
Duration of days of water contamination 72, 120, 168, 240, 360,
480
Detection performance
metrics
Performance evaluation of
algorithms
Detection Whether or not the outbreak is detected 0, 1
Speciﬁcity Probability of no alert when there is no outbreak [0, 1]
Timeliness Proportion of saved time to the outbreak duration [0, 1]
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generally accessible, and to allow identiﬁcation of promising new
biosurveillance algorithms, we developed a probabilistic model of
the detection performance of biosurveillance algorithms for differ-
ent scenarios. We used Bayesian networks (BNs) to model the rela-
tionships between detection performance, algorithm parameters,
and outbreak characteristics. BNs capture conditional indepen-
dence relationships between different variables through a param-
eterized directed graph [20], and provide a tool for making
inference in the form of what-if analysis. As such, they provide a
rich formalism for analyzing complex multi-variate data, in which
one is interested in uncovering relationships between different
variables, rather than just predicting a given type of outcome. A
Bayesian network is a directed acyclic graph, where each node rep-
resents a random variable or a group of random variables, and the
edges express conditional dependencies between random vari-
ables1. Each node has a conditional probability distribution that
reﬂects the probability of any values for that node given the values
of its parents (i.e., the nodes with direct arcs into it). Conditional
probability distributions are often represented by tables or trees,
which are considered the parameters of a BN model. The relation-
ships in a Bayesian Network model need not to be causal i.e., a direc-
ted edge between two nodes does not mean that they are causally
dependent [21]. The edges in the network represent the conditional
dependencies observed among variables. The network graph struc-
ture and its parameters are learned from data using an optimiza-
tion-based search method that tries to maximize the likelihood
function over possible network conﬁgurations. We experimented
constructing a Bayesian network using several structure learning
methods, including Navie Bayes [22], Tree Augmented Naive Bayes,
Maximum Spanning Tree, Markov Blanket learning, and Taboo
search [23]. We selected the structure with the best prediction per-
formance. After selecting the structure, the Netica software package
version 5.08 [19] was used to learn the model parameters and to per-
form the experiments reported in the next section. We reported the
area under curve (AUC) and average error rate to evaluate the accu-
racy of the model. The error rate indicates the proportion of the cases1 Technically, the lack of edges implies certain conditional independencies; for a
detailed discussion, see Pearl’s book [20] Pearl J. Probabilistic reasoning in intelligent
systems: networks of plausible inference. 1988. Morgan Kaufmann.in the test data for which the network predicted an incorrect value,
where the prediction was taken as the state with highest belief.
error rate ¼ #false positiveþ#false negative
#positiveþ#negative
The average error rate is reported based on cross-validation
runs. The AUC and conﬁdence interval were computed by cvAUC
package [24] in R.
4. Results
4.1. Evaluation of outbreak detection methods
Table 2 summarizes the overall performance for 1800 outbreaks
in terms of the minimum, maximum and average detection, spec-
iﬁcity, and the median timeliness for each algorithm. Note, how-
ever, that there is considerable variability based on outbreak
characteristics. The plot of performance evaluation is shown in
Appendix A.
On average, W3 has the highest number of detected outbreaks
(Mean of detection = 0.75), although the average speciﬁcity for this
algorithm is low (mean speciﬁcity = 0.53). On average, the most
reasonable performance belongs to C3 algorithm (mean speciﬁc-
ity = 0.78, mean of detection = 0.72). The best timeliness is
achieved by the W3 algorithm (0.83), at the expense of high rate
false alarms. With this information in mind, we are interested to
build a Bayesian network model to guide algorithm selection or
parameter tuning for a surveillance application in order to improve
the results, and to estimate the expected performance of an algo-
rithm given a particular parameters setting or surveillance
scenario.
4.2. Model evaluation
Among all BN structure learning methods examined, we found
the structure learned by Taboo search resulted in the best predic-
tion of the ‘‘detection’’ variable. This structure of the BN model
learned from the data described in Table 1 is presented in Fig. 1.
From the network structure, it is clear that the mean of the
baseline surveillance time series has a direct relationship with
the timeliness of outbreak detection. It is also apparent that the
baseline mean and variance are not independent, providing
Table 2
Performance of a number of routinely used detection algorithms on simulated surveillance data.
Algorithm Detection performance
Detection Speciﬁcity Timeliness
Min–max Mean Min–max Mean Min–max Median
C1 [0, 1] 0.459 [0.377, 1] 0.813 [0, 1] 0.721
C2 [0, 1] 0.660 [0.013, 1] 0.765 [0, 1] 0.800
C3 [0, 1] 0.724 [0.013, 1] 0.785 [0, 1] 0.818
W2 [0, 1] 0.665 [0.082, 1] 0.754 [0.5, 1] 0.818
W3 [0, 1] 0.755 [0.054, 0.903] 0.533 [0.667, 1] 0.833
Poisson Regression [0, 1] 0.658 [0.448, 1] 0.872 [0.496, 1] 0.786
Poisson Regression with guardband [0, 1] 0.675 [0.446, 0.99] 0.870 [0.536, 1] 0.789
Fig. 1. The Bayesian network model learned from algorithm benchmarking data.
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chastic processes. The graph structure also indicates that the
dependency of algorithm parameters on baseline characteristics
is mediated entirely through outbreak characteristics.
As expected, the relationship between outbreak characteristics
and algorithm parameters is mediated almost entirely through
the level of contamination and consequently the peak magnitude
of the outbreak signal and the time from onset until the peak of
the outbreak. These same outbreak characteristics also have a
direct relationship with the timeliness and speciﬁcity of detection.
The overall duration of the outbreak has only an indirect associa-
tion with algorithm parameters and detection performance.
All algorithm parameters have a direct relationship with at least
one metric of detection performance, but the threshold, history
and adjustment for weekly patterns have direct relationships with
both the speciﬁcity and the timeliness of outbreak detection. The
use of a guardband and memory has a direct association with spec-
iﬁcity, but only an indirect relationship with timeliness.
We evaluated the BNmodel presented in Fig. 1 in two scenarios,
in order to assess its ability to predict the ‘‘detection’’ and ‘‘timeli-
ness’’ variables simultaneously. Note that the goal of the BN model
is not to detect the outbreaks, but rather to predict the perfor-mance of detection methods. The evaluation is based on 5-fold
cross validation in which for each fold, 80% of the data were used
for training the model and 20% were retained for testing. In the ﬁrst
scenario, we provided the information related to all algorithm
parameters, baseline, and outbreak characteristics when predicting
detection and timeliness. This scenario corresponds to the use of
the model to explore determinants of outbreak detection with
the goal of generating new insights or guiding the development
of new algorithms. The ROC curve for the prediction of ‘‘detection’’
is presented in Fig. 2 and has an area under the curve (mean AUC)
of 0.94 with a 95% conﬁdence interval (0.91, 0.97). The error rates
of predicting ‘‘detection’’ and ‘‘timeliness’’ were 10% and 24%
respectively.
In the second evaluation scenario, we did not provide informa-
tion related to the outbreak parameters, as in practice this informa-
tion would generally not be available, or might be very imprecise.
This scenario corresponds to the use of the model to identify and
conﬁgure an algorithm for use in a public health setting. Fig. 3
shows the ROC curve for the prediction of ‘‘detection’’. In this case,
the mean AUC was 0.86 with a 95% conﬁdence interval of (0.83,
0.88) and the error rate was 20%. The presented ROC curves are
based on the best folds in the cross-validation results, however
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Fig. 2. The ROC curve of the BN model for prediction ‘‘detection’’ variable.
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Fig. 3. The ROC curve for the BN model predicting ‘‘detection’’ when outbreak
parameters are unknown.
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the general result.
4.3. Using the Bayesian network model
One of our objectives in developing the BNmodel is to guide the
selection of detection algorithms in a surveillance application. To
demonstrate the use of the model for this purpose, we apply the
model in two scenarios (Table 3). The ﬁrst column of Table 3 shows
the variables that we set to a speciﬁc value or range, depending on
the surveillance situation, including the expected outbreak speciﬁ-
cations, tolerance for false alarms (which might depend on the
resources available to further investigate alarms), or the thresholdTable 3
Using Bayesian network for inferential analysis in different surveillance situations.
What-if scenario Inferred by Ba
Speciﬁcity > 0.92 contamination level = 104 (reasonable speciﬁcity
for high contamination outbreaks)
Algorithm set
0 < threshold
Speciﬁcity > 0.92 contamination level = 106 (reasonable speciﬁcity
for low contamination outbreaks)
Algorithm set
0 < thresholdof sensitivity and timeliness of outbreak detection that is essential
for a particular population need. The second column shows the
probabilities or values of other variables inferred from Bayesian
network model together with the probabilities of the ‘‘detection’’
and ‘‘timeliness’’ variables.
In the ﬁrst scenario (ﬁrst row of Table 3), we assume surveil-
lance is focused on detection of a large GI outbreak (with contam-
ination level of 104) and can tolerate up to one false alarm every
ten days (which corresponds to a speciﬁcity greater than 0.92). The
inferred values for the algorithm parameters that result in the
highest expected detection probability are listed in the second col-
umn: a threshold of less than 1.2 and a sliding window of seven
days. The expectation of the detection probability, 0.99 and the
resulting best timeliness, 0.78, are also presented in this row. These
results are much better with respect to all performance metrics
than what we would expect on average from all the different
detection methods presented in Table 2. While, the assumption
of high contamination makes all algorithms perform better than
average, without the inference from the BN model it would have
been difﬁcult to estimate quantitatively the expected performance
under different algorithm settings.
In the second scenario, we assume a smaller outbreak (with
contamination level of 106) and a speciﬁcity greater than 0.92.
In this scenario, the best algorithm settings as listed in the second
column: a threshold of less than 1.2, sliding window of seven days
and no adjustment for weekly patterns. Following those settings,
outbreaks with low contamination can still be detected with prob-
ability of 0.7 and timeliness of 0.54. These results are better than
Table 2 with respect to the speciﬁcity, while similar to W2 and
C2 algorithms in terms of sensitivity. From these scenarios, we
can conclude that among outbreak detection algorithms examined,
C2 and W2 have the highest sensitivity for large outbreaks when
the desired speciﬁcity is greater than 0.92. Moreover, we can use
the inference from the BN guide the conﬁguration of these meth-
ods as the results in Table 2 suggest that a threshold below 1.2 will
give the best detection performance in the examined scenarios.
We can also use the BN model to guide the conﬁguration of dif-
ferent detection algorithms for a given scenario. For example, in
order to detect outbreaks with high contamination using the C2
algorithm, the alerting threshold should be smaller than 1.2. The
higher detection performance of the C1 algorithm is obtained
when the alerting threshold is between 3.75 and 5. The Adaptive
Poisson Regression algorithm is more sensitive to outbreaks when
the alerting threshold is smaller than 2.4.
Another use of the Bayesian network model is to predict, with
high accuracy, the performance of a detection method with a spe-
ciﬁc parameter setting. In Table 4, we show some example scenar-
ios of this kind. The ﬁrst row of this table assumes a detection
method with adjustments for weekly pattern, sliding window of
size seven, threshold between four and ﬁve, two days of guard-
band, and no memory. The expected detection performance in
terms of all three metrics corresponding to speciﬁcity, detection
probability, and timeliness are predicted to be 0.9, 0.63, and 0.52
respectively. The what-if scenario on the second row quantiﬁesyesian network model
ting with highest detection probability:
< 1.2 history = 7 days
Expected detection
prob.= 0.99
Expected
timeliness = 0.78
ting with highest detection probability:
< 1.2 history = 7 days no weekly patterns
Expected detection
prob.= 0.7
Expected
timeliness = 0.54
Table 4
Using Bayesian network for inferential analysis for different algorithm conﬁgurations.
What-if scenario Inferred by Bayesian network model
Weekly pattern = 1 Expected speciﬁcity = 0.9
History = 7 Expected detection prob. = 0.63
4 < threshold < 5 Expected timeliness = 0.52
Guardband = 2
No memory
Weekly pattern = 1 Expected speciﬁcity = 0.72
History = 56 Expected detection prob. = 0.81
4 < threshold < 5 Expected timeliness = 0.58
No guardband
No memory
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Fig. A.1. Detection rate of a number of routinely used detection algorithms on
simulated surveillance data.
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Fig. A.2. Speciﬁcity of three detection algorithms on simulated surveillance data.
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Fig. A.3. Timeliness of three detection algorithms on simulated surveillance data.
186 N. Jafarpour et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 53 (2015) 180–187the performance trade-off in sensitivity and speciﬁcity if we drop
the guardband and increase the size of the sliding window from
the scenario 1. The speciﬁcity decreases to 0.72 while the detection
probability increases to 0.81, with a slight change in timeliness.
5. Discussion and conclusion
In this study, we analyzed outbreak detection performance for a
range of algorithms that are commonly used in public health prac-
tice, considering a range of features related to the outbreak charac-
teristics, baseline data, and the parameter settings for the detection
methods. We assessed the performance of seven different outbreak
detection algorithms using simulated and real surveillance data for
GI outbreaks in eighteen outbreak scenarios and trained Bayesian
networks to model the relationships between all surveillance attri-
butes and the detection performance. Our evaluation results show
that even when the outbreak characteristics were unknown a
priori, the model was able to predict detection performance with
high accuracy (AUC = 0.86).
The Bayesian network model developed in this paper allows
quantifying the effect of outbreak characteristics and algorithm
conﬁgurations on the performance of detection algorithms. As
expected, the most informative determinants of detection perfor-
mance were the alerting threshold, which is a parameter of the
detection method, and the contamination level and the peak size
of the outbreak. But our model also quantiﬁed the contribution
of other algorithm features such as accounting for day-of-week
and maintaining a guardband or memory. We demonstrated how
inference performed using our model can help to develop what-if
analyses for using detection methods in practice, or to ﬁnd an
appropriate algorithm conﬁguration given the desired level of
detection performance for outbreak scenarios. Such an inferential
tool gives insight into the features of detection methods that are
important to provide better performance. We also described how
the model can be utilized to predict the expected performance of
detection methods in different surveillance situations.
One limitation in comparing surveillance methods is the lack of
data for benchmarking. This limitation was addressed in our work
by using simulated data. Our approach is similar in spirit to the
research reported by Lewis and colleagues [25], who used simula-
tion of inﬂuenza outbreaks to evaluate spatiotemporal outbreak
detection methods. However, they did not quantify the effects of
algorithm parameters on detection performance, and we believe
this is an important contribution of our research.
Our approach can be extended to allow a coherent evaluation of
new algorithms and new data sources as needed. In particular,
using our current model, we can evaluate outbreak detection per-
formance for new algorithms different than the C, W, and Adaptive
Poisson algorithms. Any conﬁguration of considered parameters in
our model different than the ones belonging to these algorithms
can be thought of as a new detection method and can also be
evaluated.We presented several scenarios of outbreaks and desired per-
formance, and used inference to suggest the best algorithm and
parameter setting to use, as well as to quantify the expected per-
formance. These scenarios are by no means exhaustive, and are
meant as examples of what kinds of inference can be performed.
Of course, in order to use this model as a tool for what-if analysis
in the public health sector, an adequate interface would also need
to be developed, but this goes beyond the scope of our work.
N. Jafarpour et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 53 (2015) 180–187 187We used emergency department visits as the baseline time
series for outbreak detection. In recent years, non-traditional data
sources have been introduced in public health and surveillance
systems. This includes mobile phone data [26], social data [27],
micro-blogging [28], Twitter feeds and Google search queries
[29]. While introducing and combining new data sources, espe-
cially in the era of big data, are promising directions for research
in biosurveillance systems, the evaluation of their relevance and
signiﬁcance will be extremely important. Evaluation studies such
as [30] are needed to compare these new data sources to the
existing ones, and the approach that we describe could be used
to consider the relative contribution to detection performance of
data sources and algorithms.
A number of extensions to this work may improve the general-
izability of the results. We used simulated outbreaks superimposed
on real surveillance data; therefore, the results are affected by the
quality of the simulation. Our approach can be extended by includ-
ing more detection methods, using spatio-temporal data simula-
tions, and considering health care utilization data sources in
addition to ED visits.
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Appendix A
Fig. A.1 shows the detection probability of different detection
algorithms for 1800 outbreaks respectively.
Figs. A.2 and A.3 show the probability of different values of
speciﬁcity and timeliness of three algorithms for the data set
respectively. The performance of other algorithms is very close to
the illustrated ones of the same family.
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